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THE RELEVANCE OF RELEVANCE: SECTION 215
OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE NSA
METADATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
Casey J. McGowan*
In June 2013, a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward
Snowden, leaked classified documents exposing a number of secret
government programs. Among these programs was the “telephony
metadata” collection program under which the government collects records
from phone companies containing call record data for nearly every
American. News of this program created considerable controversy and led
to a wave of litigation contesting the validity of the program.
The legality of the metadata collection program has been challenged on
both constitutional and statutory grounds. The program derives its
authority from Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified as 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861. The statute requires that there be reasonable grounds to believe
the data collected is “relevant to an authorized investigation.” The
government deems all these records “relevant” based on the fact that they
are used to find patterns and connections in preventing terrorist activity.
Critics of the program, however, assert that billions of records cannot
possibly be relevant when a negligible portion of those records are actually
linked to terrorist activity.
This Note examines the conflicting
interpretations of “relevant,” and concludes that while the current state of
the law permits bulk data collection, the power of the NSA to collect
records on such a large scale must be reined in.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor, leaked information to the press concerning several secret
government programs.1 Snowden’s files revealed that the U.S. government
had ordered Verizon to release phone record data for millions of
customers.2 This order was part of a larger “telephony metadata”3
1. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013).
2. See id.
3. Metadata refers to the business records information acquired through programs such
as the NSA surveillance programs that Snowden’s leaked documents refer to. Metadata
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collection program4 for all domestic phone calls on the network.5 Snowden
has since been charged with espionage and theft of government property.6
He currently resides in Russia, where he was granted temporary political
asylum, although he could seek permanent asylum in another country.7
Snowden’s status has caused significant tension between the United States
and Russia, and he has become an extremely divisive figure.8 Some view
him as a champion of individual rights, while others believe his actions
were unjustified and have labeled him a traitor.9
The leaks have put the U.S. government in the tenuous position of facing
both public and legal scrutiny for this and similar programs. The
government has acknowledged the existence of the programs and confirmed
the validity of the leaked information.10 The metadata collection program
is authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was enacted as
section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).11 The metadata
collection program began in 2006, and as of October 2013, has been
renewed thirty-five times.12 In response to the public and media outcry, the
White House issued an administration white paper outlining the legal basis

includes time, date, and routing information of telephone calls. Joseph T. Thai, Is Data
Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Steven’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1731, 1734 n.18 (2006).
4. The program has been referred to by a number of names including the “bulk data
collection program,” the “bulk telephony metadata collection program,” the “telephony
records program,” and the “metadata records program.” This Note refers to it as the
metadata collection program.
5. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, or a Writ of Certiorari at 3, In re
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58), 2013 WL 3484365, at *3
[hereinafter EPIC Petition]. The order required Verizon to produce call detail records “(i)
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls.” In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. ex rel. MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc., No. BR
13-80, slip op. at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/
Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf [hereinafter FISC Order].
6. Pete Williams & Becky Bratu, US Charges NSA Leaker Snowden with Espionage,
NBC NEWS (June 21, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/21/
19079389-us-charges-nsa-leaker-snowden-with-espionage?lite.
7. Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant Russia Grants Snowden Year’s
Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at A1.
8. Stephen Moore, Note, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an International Cyber
Treaty, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 223, 252 (2013).
9. See Alexander E. Blanchard, A False Choice: Prior Restraint and Subsequent
Punishment in a Wikileaks World, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 45 (2013).
10. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (2013) (13 Civ. 3994(WHP)), 2013 WL 2492595.
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 1 (2013), available at
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf.
12. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013).
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for the program,13 which has been rebuked by both privacy interest groups
and scholars.14
In addition to public scrutiny, the government faces legal action from a
number of groups. One of the predominant pending cases involves the
ACLU suing a group of high-ranking government officials involved in
matters of national security.15 Private individuals brought a similar suit in
the D.C. District Court.16 Additionally, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to
vacate the Verizon order.17 One main contention, voiced by the public at
large, as well as scholars and privacy interest groups, is that common sense
dictates that collecting billions of records precludes the possibility that all—
or even most—of those records are “relevant” to an investigation, as
required by section 215.18 This Note addresses the various arguments
concerning relevance and determines whether the metadata program
comports with the language of its statutory authorization.
The records collection program is extremely expansive, as evidenced by
the leaked documentation supporting the allegations, impacting millions of
Americans whose records are being tracked. Given the far-reaching effects
of the metadata collection program, the current litigation is more pertinent
to everyday privacy rights and civil liberties than similar attempts in the
past. The direction that the courts deciding this issue take in the current
litigation will likely impact Fourth Amendment rights and basic privacy
rights in the United States for years to come.
Part I of this Note provides background information about the origins of
the metadata collection program and its purported legal basis. This includes
the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and prior judicial
interpretations of these amendments, as well as the enactment of the Patriot
Act and its later amendments. Part II explains the conflict between the
federal government and various privacy interest groups in determining how
the term “relevant” should be understood and whether the program is legal.

13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Problem with the Administration “White Paper” on the
Telephony Metadata Program, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:34 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/12/problem-withthe-administration-white-paper-on-thetelephony-metadata-program/. In addition to the academic debate surrounding the program,
it has become a highly litigated issue with a number of interested parties submitting amicus
briefs opposing metadata collection. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in
Support of Petitioner, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/in-re-epic/Cato-Amicus.pdf [hereinafter Cato Brief];
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professors of Information Privacy and Surveillance Law in Support
of Petitioner, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (No. 13-58), available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/etc/section-215-amicus-8.pdf
[hereinafter
Privacy
Professors’ Brief]; see also infra Parts I.E, II.B.
15. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10.
16. See infra Part I.E.2.
17. Timothy B. Lee, Could the Supreme Court Stop the NSA?, WASH. POST (July 9,
2013, 9:15 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/09/nsalitigation-could-go-straight-to-the-supreme-court/.
18. See infra Part II.B.
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Finally, Part III argues that while the current state of the law weighs in
favor of the metadata collection program, the court should rein in the
NSA’s power to collect private information without probable cause in light
of technological developments and privacy concerns.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, WARRANTLESS SEARCHES, AND STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATIONS: HOW MASS DATA COLLECTION BECAME AN
INVESTIGATIVE NORM
Part I discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment protections in regard
to technological advances, as well as the history of section 215 of the
Patriot Act.19 Part I.A explores constitutional issues surrounding the
metadata collection program. Part I.B discusses the statutory authorization
for the program—section 215 of the Patriot Act—and the history of that
Act. Part I.C surveys the metadata collection program, including how the
NSA claims to use the information and what procedural safeguards exist.
Part I.D introduces past cases challenging similar NSA surveillance
programs and their relation to the current telephony data collection
program. Part I.E provides the framework for the current litigation, and
Part I.F addresses the issue of standing in those cases.
A. The Constitutional Framework for Mass Data Collection
The metadata collection program implicates both First and Fourth
Amendment concerns. Although this type of surveillance has not been
squarely addressed by the Supreme Court, past search and seizure
jurisprudence is especially relevant to understanding the legality of the
program and is discussed in Part I.A.1. Part I.A.2 briefly sets forth the
relevant First Amendment issues.
1. Defining a “Search”: Constitutional Limits on Warrants and the
Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The metadata collection program involves the collection of data without a
warrant, raising significant Fourth Amendment concerns. The Fourth
Amendment states, in relevant part, that people have the right “to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”20 In drafting the Amendment, the Constitution’s Framers
sought to have the boundaries of a search narrowly defined before it
occurs.21 The use of warrants as a check on the system helps eliminate the
potential for abuse of the power to search, even when the investigating
officer has good intentions.22
19. The Patriot Act is the common name for the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 532 (2006).
22. Id.
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The Fourth Amendment has been understood to mean that searches for
evidence of a crime, and seizures of such evidence, are presumptively
unreasonable when no warrant is obtained, unless the search falls into one
of the few recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.23 What is
considered a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment has been a
source of debate and controversy, leading to the Supreme Court’s repeated
consideration of the issue. Katz v. United States24 set forth the test for
when government activity amounts to a search. The Court applied that
standard in Smith v. Maryland25 and determined that the Fourth
Amendment no longer protects information provided to a third party. More
recently, in United States v. Jones,26 Justices Sotomayor and Alito
recognized, in concurring opinions, that it may be time to reevaluate the
third-party doctrine laid out in Smith.
a. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation Test
In Katz v. United States, the Court held that a “search” can occur even
without physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area.”27 In
Katz, FBI agents wiretapped a public phone booth where a suspected
gambler, Charles Katz, had conversations about his wagers.28 Katz argued
that his privacy was violated by such a “search” in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment.29 The Court agreed, holding that Katz had an
expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations and that the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
claiming its protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been
invaded by the government.30 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan delineated
a two-question inquiry for determining whether a search has occurred:
(1) whether the individual “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy”31 and (2) whether the subjective expectation of privacy is “one that

23. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE 32 (9th ed. 2010). Courts have recognized a number of exceptions to the
warrant requirement over time. Searches pursuant to one of these categories are exempt
from the warrant requirement and evidence found during that search is admissible. For
example, the Court has recognized an exigent circumstances exception, which permits
officers to conduct a search without a warrant where immediate action is necessary to
prevent the loss of evidence or to protect the safety of the public or police officers. Id. at
361. Additionally, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court stated that officers who have a
right to be in a particular place may seize evidence in plain view if they have probable cause
to believe it is subject to seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466
(1971). This is by no means an exhaustive discussion, as there are a number of other
recognized exceptions by which a search may be found lawful, even without a valid warrant.
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
26. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
28. Id. at 348.
29. Id. at 349.
30. See id. at 353, 359.
31. Id. at 361.
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society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”32 This analysis was then
applied in subsequent cases involving privacy rights in technology.33
The Court noted that, historically, searches only occurred upon physical
penetration,34 and that without an actual trespass, the Fourth Amendment
was not violated.35 However, Katz and subsequent cases moved away from
this interpretation and took a more expansive view of what constitutes a
search.36
b. Eroding Fourth Amendment Protections:
Applications of the Katz Principle
Since Katz, the reasonable expectation test has been applied to modern
investigative techniques. In recent cases, courts have frequently held that
an individual lacked an expectation of privacy, and thus the investigation
was not a “search” subject to Fourth Amendment protections.37
i. Smith v. Maryland: The Third-Party Doctrine
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed the issue of whether a pen
register38 is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus
requiring a warrant.39 Petitioner Michael Lee Smith was convicted of
robbing Patricia McDonough’s home and making threatening phone calls to
the residence afterwards.40 Smith was suspected as the robber after police
traced the license plate number of a suspicious vehicle seen outside the
home back to him.41 The day after obtaining the registration information,
police directed Smith’s telephone company to install a pen register on his
number without obtaining a warrant.42 The register revealed that Smith’s
32. Id.
33. See infra note 37; see also infra Part I.A.1.b.
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
35. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (stating that without a
physical invasion into a defendant’s house or “curtilage,” there is no search or seizure within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
134–36 (1942) (holding that because the trespass did not materially aid in the collection of
evidence, the Fourth Amendment was not violated).
36. For a full discussion of the Katz principle, cases encouraging a more flexible
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and the application of Katz to evolving
technologies, see Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still
Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 125–39 (2012).
37. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that despite an
individual’s attempts to restrict some views of his activities (i.e., from ground level), there is
no expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance from 1,000 feet because it is public
airspace); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (affirming that individuals do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields); United States v. White, 890 F.2d
1012 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public
restroom stall).
38. A pen register is a device that records the numbers called by the telephone to which
it is attached. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 23, at 50.
39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979).
40. Id. at 737.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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number had called the McDonough residence, which the police then used to
obtain a search warrant for his home.43 During the search, a phonebook
was found open to the page listing the McDonough’s number, and Mrs.
McDonough later identified Smith in a six-man lineup.44 Smith sought to
suppress all evidence derived from the pen register since the police had
failed to obtain a warrant prior to its installation.45
Applying Katz, the Court acknowledged that a search can occur even
without a physical invasion into a “constitutionally protected area.”46
Citing Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, the Court divided the issue into
two discrete questions: (1) whether the individual had a subjective
expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expectation is one that society
views as reasonable.47 Smith had no claim that his property was invaded,
because the register was installed at the telephone company’s office. He
argued instead that despite the lack of a trespass, his expectation of privacy
The Court, however, distinguished the
was infringed upon.48
communications in Katz from those in Smith based on the fact that a pen
register does not collect the contents of the call itself, only information
about the call.49
The Court stated, first, that people cannot have an expectation of privacy
in this type of data since they must realize this information is conveyed to
telephone companies and retained for billing purposes, among other
reasons.50 The Court further noted that even if Smith had a subjective
expectation of privacy, it was not objectively reasonable, as “the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed.”51 Because Smith voluntarily conveyed
the information to a third party, he assumed the risk that the company
would reveal the information to police,52 and therefore the search did not
require a warrant.53 This approach, known as the third-party doctrine, holds
that information conveyed to a third party is susceptible to exposure to law
enforcement without the speaker’s consent.54
Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that numbers dialed from a private
phone fall under the same constitutional protection as private conversations,

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 739.
47. Id. at 740.
48. Id. at 741.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 742–43.
51. Id. at 744 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 745–46.
54. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563 (2009).
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and that Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 In a separate
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that implicit in the notion of assumption of
risk is a sense of choice, and that in older consensual surveillance cases, the
defendant had some discretion in determining who could access his
communications.56 Justice Marshall argued that with the advent of
technology and its role in everyday life, the majority promoted the rule that
“unless a person is willing to forgo use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of
surveillance.”57
ii. United States v. Jones: Modernizing the Fourth Amendment
In a more recent test of Fourth Amendment limits, the Court applied the
Katz test in United States v. Jones.58 There, the Court addressed the issue
of whether attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and using it to
monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.59 Law enforcement applied for a warrant authorizing the use
of a GPS tracking device on the car of a suspected drug trafficker’s wife.60
The warrant was issued with the requirement that the device be installed
within ten days.61 Agents waited until the eleventh day to install the GPS
device and then proceeded to track the car’s movements over the course of
the next twenty-eight days.62 The drug trafficker moved to suppress the
GPS evidence, but the district court only partially granted the motion, ruling
that the data obtained while the vehicle was in the private parking garage
where they first installed the device was inadmissible.63 The trafficker was
convicted of drug-related offenses, but on appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed,
holding that the evidence was obtained by warrantless use of the GPS, thus
violating the Fourth Amendment.64
The Supreme Court held that a “search” had occurred and that the
trafficker’s Fourth Amendment rights were therefore violated.65 Justice
Scalia reasoned that Katz “did not erode the principle ‘that, when the
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally
protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.’”66 The Court stated that Katz did not

55. Smith, 442 U.S. at 747.
56. Id. at 750.
57. Id.; see also Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 546 (discussing how, in modern life, it is
not truly “voluntary” to turn over personal information, as such exposure is inevitable by
individuals availing themselves of technological conveniences and societal norms).
58. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
59. Id. at 948.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The data tracking his movements on public roadways, however, was admissible
as there is no expectation of privacy in that information. Id.
64. Id. at 949.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)).
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narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope, and that the reasonable expectation
of privacy test was an addition to the common law trespass understanding
of a search.67
The Court, in Jones, acknowledged the existence of related issues and
addressed the difficulty inherent in deciding those issues. Questions of
whether the crime involved affects the scope of a search or whether visual
surveillance through electronic means, without any trespass, constitutes a
search remain unanswered.68 Justice Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion,
expressed concern over the fact that technology now makes physical
intrusion unnecessary in most cases.69 She stated, “More fundamentally, it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties,” because in the growing age of digital technology, people are
routinely required to provide information about themselves in the course of
carrying out their daily activities.70 She urged that the Fourth Amendment
protections may only be applied if the Court’s jurisprudence “ceases to treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy,” but acknowledged that those
questions need not be resolved in Jones because of the physical intrusion
into his car.71
Justice Alito stressed that technology can change the expectations of a
reasonable person:
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in
popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff
worthwhile. . . .
On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur
the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.72

Although there is no simple solution for what test to use in determining
whether Fourth Amendment protections apply, the Court has begun to
acknowledge that there are many unresolved issues in this body of law.
This decision may very well be the beginning of a paradigm shift in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.73

67. Id. at 951–52.
68. Id. at 953–54.
69. Id. at 955; see also Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth
Amendment and the Use of Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489,
502 (2012).
70. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 962.
73. Emas & Pallas, supra note 36, at 165, 167.
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2. Free Speech and the First Amendment
The metadata collection program also raises First Amendment concerns.
The First Amendment protects the right to free speech,74 and critics of the
program have asserted that it infringes on protected speech.75 This
particular aspect of the metadata collection program is currently being
litigated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in First Unitarian Church of
Los Angeles v. NSA.76
B. Statutory Authorization for the Program: Patriot Act Section 215
The business records provision of FISA, enacted as section 215 of the
Patriot Act, authorizes the metadata collection program.77 Although FISA
is over thirty years old, its application and powers expanded greatly after
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.78
1. History of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA was first enacted in 1978 and governs electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes.79 Although the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure also govern searches and electronic surveillance, “the secret and
less protective rules and procedures of FISA may be employed”80 when
matters of national security are involved and the aim is to collect foreign
intelligence. The underlying rationale holds that threats of terrorism are
particularly serious, and therefore “privacy intrusions are limited to the
collection of information for foreign intelligence purposes.”81

74. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. While this Note focuses on the search aspect of the metadata collection program, the
concerns about First Amendment free speech protections are an important aspect of the
debate. For a discussion of First Amendment rights in cyberlaw, see Anupam Chander &
Uyên Lê, The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw (U.C. Davis Legal Studies, Working
Paper No. 351, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2320124.
76. The First Amendment issues raised by this litigation are beyond the scope of this
Note. However, for an overview of this case and the First Amendment concerns raised by
the metadata collection program, see First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/first-unitarian-church-los-angelesv-nsa (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Critics contend that even though the actual content of the
calls is not obtained, the NSA is able to piece together enough information that the program
violates First Amendment protections. For example, in 2006, then Senator Joe Biden told
CBS that the content of calls is not necessary to know about that person’s life, and that based
solely on what calls an individual makes, it is possible to get a pattern of that person’s life
that is “very, very intrusive.” The Early Show (CBS television broadcast May 12, 2006),
available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/flashback-biden-agrees-accessmetadata-very-very-intrusive-video.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 1.
78. See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
79. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After
the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2003).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1148–49.
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FISA imposes less judicial control over the scope of surveillance than
other statutory regimes and does not always require meeting the high
standard of probable cause before surveillance can commence.82 FISA has
been construed to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore compliance with these procedures and criteria
has been held as an adequate substitute for a warrant.83 The surveillance
authorized by FISA, however, is not intended for law enforcement
purposes, as there is a distinction between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement.84 There is often a suspicion of criminal activity when
surveillance of U.S. citizens is involved, but law enforcement was never the
main purpose of FISA.85
2. Establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
The FISC was established by 50 U.S.C. § 1803 and consists of eleven
district court judges from at least seven of the federal circuits, all of whom
must reside within twenty miles of the District of Columbia.86 FISC judges
are publicly designated by the chief justice of the United States.87 They
have the power to “hear applications for and grant orders approving
electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States,” but may not
hear an application that was previously denied by another FISC judge.88
In addition to the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review (FISCR) has been described as “the nation’s most secret appellate
court.”89 This court meets on extremely rare occasions, convening for the
first time in its then twenty-four year history in 2002.90 The FISCR
consists of a three-judge panel and considers appeals from FISC
decisions.91 These three judges are also designated by the chief justice of
the United States and must be federal district court or appellate court
judges.92 This panel may review any denial of an application made to the
FISC.93 Judges on both the FISC and the FISCR serve a maximum of
seven years and are not eligible for redesignation once that period has
expired.94
82. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 533.
83. Banks, supra note 79, at 1158; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573
(1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984). The requirements of FISA have been relaxed
since these decisions, and obtaining foreign intelligence still satisfies the Fourth Amendment
requirements, even where it is a significant purpose of surveillance, rather than the primary
purpose. See United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 337, 341–45 (3d Cir. 2011).
84. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1160.
85. Id.
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1171.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 1803(d).
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3. FISC Orders and the Requirement of Relevance
Under FISA, the government can submit applications to the FISC
requesting that they order the production of certain records. Recipients of a
FISC subpoena for records may challenge that order.95 The subpoena may
be quashed if the challenging party can show that the information sought is
privileged or is “not relevant to a legitimate inquiry.”96 The challenging
party must petition the FISC, at which time a FISC judge is assigned to
review the petition for frivolity.97 If the petition is not frivolous, it is
considered, and may be granted only if “the judge finds that [the] order does
not meet the requirements” of 50 U.S.C. § 186198 or that it is “otherwise
unlawful.”99 The problem with this system, however, is that only the
recipient of the order—no other individual—has a right of judicial review
before the FISC.100 The party who receives a subpoena is generally not the
party whose privacy interests are at stake, thus providing them with little
incentive to challenge the order.101
Prior to September 11, FISA was a fairly unknown statute, particularly
among the general public.102 From 1979 through 2000, the FISC received
an average of approximately 600 warrant applications per year, but never
rejected an application.103 From 2001 through 2012, however, that number
increased drastically, as the FISC received an average of over 1,700
applications, rejecting only eleven.104 This was due, in large part, to the
amendment of sections 215 and 505 of the Patriot Act, which reduced the
threshold requirements for intelligence and records gathering.105
In 2012, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the
government made 1,856 applications to the FISC.106 Of those, 1,789 were
requests to conduct electronic surveillance.107 All of the applications were
approved by the FISC with the exception of one, which was later withdrawn

95. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 545.
96. Id.
97. 50 U.S.C § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
98. For a full discussion of 50 U.S.C § 1861 and the requirements set forth in the
business records provision of FISA, see infra Part I.B.4.
99. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(B).
100. See id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i).
101. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 545. Schulhofer suggests that investigators should be
required to obtain warrants based on probable cause in order to align more closely with the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 545–46.
102. Id. at 534–35.
103. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2012, EPIC.ORG,
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
104. Id.
105. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 549. The reduced requirements and the extension of
FISA to a broader range of information provides investigators with “quick, relatively
unsupervised access to highly personal and politically sensitive records.” Id. at 548–50.
106. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Attorney General, to Harry Reid,
Senate Majority Leader 1 (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/
foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf.
107. Id.
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by the government.108 Two hundred and twelve of those applications were
for business records under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, all of which were approved in
their entirety.109
4. FISA After 9/11: 50 U.S.C. § 1861, Statutory Authority for the
Metadata Collection Program
The metadata collection program derives its legal authority from section
215 of the Patriot Act,110 which amended parts of FISA.111 The Patriot Act
was passed within a few weeks of 9/11, after limited debates, in an effort to
give the White House administration greater authority and power in their
efforts to counteract terrorism.112 The statute allows the director of the FBI
or his designee to “make an application for an order requiring the
production of any tangible things” in order to collect information
concerning foreign intelligence.113 It also stipulates that any investigation
concerning U.S. persons must not be conducted solely on the basis of
activities that are protected under the First Amendment.114 Investigations
must be conducted in accordance with Executive Order 12,333, which
provides guidance for U.S. Intelligence Activities.115
The application must contain a statement of facts showing that there are
“reasonable grounds” to suspect that the items sought are “relevant to an
authorized investigation.”116 It goes on to provide three examples of things
that are presumptively relevant to the investigation:
[T]hey pertain to—(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact
with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject
of such authorized investigation . . . .117

While this is not an exhaustive list of what may be considered relevant, it
does provide a sense of what the legislature had in mind in enacting the
statute.
The statute further provides for the procedures to be followed upon
judicial approval, and describes what the order must contain.118 It also
limits whom recipients of an order may disclose information to119 and
provides that anyone who turns over the tangible things designated by the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
110. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
111. Banks, supra note 79, at 1166.
112. Id.
113. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2006).
114. Id. § 1861(a)(2)(B).
115. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470,
3 C.F.R. 218, 227 (2008), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 934–43 (Supp. V
2011).
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 1861(c).
119. Id. § 1861(d).
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order in good faith will not be liable for such production.120 Subsection f
permits recipients of an order to file for judicial review of that order in
accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(1).121 It also permits a recipient to
challenge the nondisclosure order one year after the issuance of the original
order and outlines the procedures for how such a review is to be
conducted.122 Finally, the statute requires the attorney general to adopt
minimization procedures123 to govern the retention of information received
pursuant to orders authorized by this title.124 Any “tangible things”
collected must be used in accordance with these minimization
procedures.125
Although the title (50 U.S.C. § 1861) is lengthy and involved, there are
three essential legal elements concerning the metadata collection program:
(1) the collection is part of an authorized investigation, (2) the records
obtained are “tangible things,” and (3) the data collected is relevant to that
investigation.126 This Note addresses whether the metadata collection
program meets these requirements, focusing on the relevancy standard as
applied to mass data collection.
C. The Telephony Metadata Collection Program
The metadata collection program is a complicated and secretive
endeavor, but since the initial Snowden leaks, information has slowly
become available, resulting in a rapidly developing understanding of the
program. Part I.C.1 discusses the purpose of the program. Part I.C.2
provides an overview of how the collected data is used, and Part I.C.3
considers past compliance problems where program guidelines were not
followed properly.
1. Purpose of the Program
Beginning in 2006, the federal government implemented a metadata
collection program for the purpose of “combating international terrorism
and preventing potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks on [the United
States]” by “identifying terrorist operatives and networks” through the
examination of terrorist communications.127 The metadata collection
program is designed to give the NSA the ability to identify terrorist threats
120. Id. § 1861(e).
121. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i); see also supra Part I.B.3.
122. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)–(D).
123. Minimization procedures refers to the specific guidelines that minimize the
retention, and prevent the dissemination, of nonpublic information. They do, however, allow
information to be disclosed in specific law enforcement and foreign intelligence scenarios.
See id. § 1861(g)(2).
124. Id. § 1861(g)(1).
125. Id. § 1861(h).
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 6–16. The white paper also discusses
the fact that although the orders are prospective in nature, they still comply with § 1861. Id.
at 16. This however, has not been a highly contested issue and, therefore, is not relevant to
this Note.
127. Id. at 1–2.
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within the country.128 The term “metadata” is used to refer to call data that
does not include the contents of the calls.129 By following connections and
patterns in phone records, NSA analysts seek to find links in the structure of
terrorist organizations.130
2. How the Data Is Analyzed
The program involves collecting phone records directly from service
providers,131 pursuant to orders from the FISC.132 The records include both
calls made entirely within the United States, as well as those between a U.S.
number and a number abroad.133 Initially, there was much speculation
about what “call detail records” referred to,134 but in August 2013, the
White House acknowledged that the data includes “the numbers dialed, the
length and time of the calls and other similar dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information.”135
Once the data is collected, it is stored in secure databases by the NSA.136
The records are only supposed to be accessed for counterterrorism
purposes,137 and the data may only be queried upon a finding of reasonable
articulable suspicion (RAS)138 that the information is associated with one or
more specified foreign terrorist organizations, the determination of which
must be made by one of twenty-two authorized persons at the NSA.139 This
number is known as the “seed” identifier.140 After an analyst is approved to
conduct the query, the inquiry is limited to records within three “hops” of
the identifier, meaning that the results of the search show the records for the
number that is suspected to be in contact with a terrorist organization (first
hop), the numbers in contact with that first hop (second hop), and the
numbers in contact with the second hop (third hop).141 This is designed to

128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id. at 2–3.
131. Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T have all been confirmed as recipients of the FISC orders.
Verizon has 98.9 million wireless customers and 22.2 million landline customers, Sprint has
a total of 55 million customers, and AT&T has 107.3 million wireless customers, in addition
to its 31.2 million landline customers. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez & Janet Hook, U.S.
Collects Vast Data Trove, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2013, at A1.
132. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3.
133. FISC Order, supra note 5, at 2.
134. See EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at 9.
135. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 20.
136. David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER
SERIES 10 (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf.
137. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3.
138. Reasonable, articulable suspicion is defined as the ability “to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
139. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3–5.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 3–4. For an example of how this works in practice and an explanation of how
expansive this system has the potential to be, see Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL),
2013 WL 6571596, at *7 n.21 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
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give analysts the flexibility to find patterns of communication and
connections among numbers.142
Any data that has not been reviewed is retained for five years and then
automatically purged.143 Additionally, any data that is found to have been
improperly collected is also purged.144
3. Past Compliance Problems
Although there are standards and procedures in place, numerous
problems have arisen regarding the use of the collected data. In a March
2009 order, FISC Judge Walton expressed concern over a number of past
indiscretions involving NSA use of metadata.145 For example, an alert list
was set up to help prioritize the review of metadata, with all matches
subject to the RAS standard before review.146 However, most of the
metadata that was queried was not RAS approved. In fact, the government
reported that as of January 15, 2009, only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on
the alert list were granted RAS status by an authorized NSA official.147
Additionally, misrepresentations were made to the FISC concerning the
alert-list process and the metadata collection program.148 The NSA
reported that this was due, in part, to the fact that “from a technical
standpoint, there was no single person who had a complete technical
understanding of [the collection program].”149
D. Past NSA Surveillance and Jewel v. NSA
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the NSA has been scrutinized
for a number of surveillance programs.150 Notably, in the aftermath of
9/11, President Bush expanded a surveillance program to include domestic
communications with suspected terrorists, where previously, NSA
warrantless surveillance was limited to parties outside the United States.151
As early as 2006, reports indicated that mass data collection from American
telephone companies was occurring, but that surveillance occurred without
approval from the FISC.152
The history of NSA surveillance is extensive and ultimately beyond the
scope of this Note, yet one ongoing case is particularly relevant in the
142. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 4.
143. Kris, supra note 136, at 15.
144. Id.
145. See generally In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009
WL 9150913 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. at *2 n.2.
148. Id. at *3–4. For example, Judge Walton points to repeated misrepresentations about
the alert list process. Id.
149. Id. at *4.
150. See How the NSA’s Domestic Spying Program Works, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
151. Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357, 391.
152. See id. at 391–92.
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current context. In Jewel v. NSA, the Electronic Frontier Foundation sued
the government agencies involved in dragnet surveillance.153 Originally
filed in 2008, the suit is ongoing, but essentially seeks to prevent the same
type of dragnet surveillance that has been at issue since the Snowden
disclosures.154 The complaint alleges that the government was operating a
dragnet surveillance program by soliciting AT&T for the disclosure of all
information in their telephone and internet records databases.155
In 2009, the Obama Administration moved to dismiss, asserting that it
would require the government to divulge “state secrets.”156 The suit was
instead dismissed on standing grounds, but was renewed in 2011 when the
Ninth Circuit found the allegations were sufficient and the suit could
continue in the district court.157 The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
alleged a concrete and particularized injury, the challenged action was fairly
traceable to the harm suffered, and the issue was redressable.158 Because
there was standing, the suit was remanded to the district court to consider
defenses, particularly whether the state secrets privilege prevented this
action.159
In 2013, the Northern District of California found that the state secrets
privilege was preempted by the procedural mechanisms of FISA under
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).160 The plaintiffs brought their claims under a number
of FISA provisions, but notably not under 50 U.S.C. § 1861.161 The court
dismissed some of the statutory claims alleged by the plaintiffs, and noted
that although there was standing, “the potential risk to national security may
still be too great to pursue confirmation of the existence or facts relating to
the scope of the alleged governmental Program.”162
E. Current Litigation
This Note attempts to examine the relevancy standard and its application
to the metadata collection program. That issue has been one of the main
points of contention in a number of current lawsuits, and courts are now
faced with the task of determining just how broad “relevant” is in relation to
authorized national security surveillance programs. The Supreme Court
declined to hear this issue, but in two lower court decisions, the judges
153. See Jewel v. NSA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
154. See id. (stating that the evidence in the case was “confirmed by the government in
June, 2013”).
155. Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2011).
156. Id. The state secrets privilege allows the government to “bar the disclosure of
information if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that disclosure will ‘expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, No. C08-04373 JSW, No. C07-00693 JSW, 2013 WL 3829405, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
July 23, 2013) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
157. Jewel v. NSA, supra note 153.
158. Jewel, 673 F.3d at 908–12.
159. Id. at 913–14.
160. Jewel, 2013 WL 3829405, at *7.
161. See id. at *3.
162. Id. at *15.
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deciding the case took very different views of the metadata collection
program’s legality. Klayman v. Obama163 and ACLU v. Clapper164
represent the first time a non-FISC judge has weighed in on the merits of
the program.165 Judge Leon, of the D.C. district court, reached the
conclusion that the metadata collection program is not legal, while Judge
Pauley, of the Southern District of New York, came to the opposite
conclusion. In Part II, the arguments made in these three suits are examined
collectively, as the points made are very similar and will inform the
decisions on appeal.
1. In re Electronic Privacy Information Center
In In re Electronic Privacy Information Center,166 EPIC petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or, alternatively, a writ of certiorari
to review the FISC’s decision.167 EPIC broadly argued that the metadata
collection program does not comply with its statutory authority and, by
granting the orders, the FISC exceeded its lawful jurisdiction.168 EPIC
further argued that because of the structure of the FISC, the Supreme Court
is the only court that can grant relief,169 and as a Verizon customer for the
entire duration of the program,170 EPIC has suffered an injury and is
entitled to the writ. To grant a writ, the court must find that three
requirements are met: (1) the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
means of relief, (2) they have shown that the right to the writ is clear and
indisputable, and (3) the issuing court believes the writ is appropriate given
the circumstances.171 On November 18, 2013, the Court denied the writ
without explanation.172
2. Klayman v. Obama
In the first of two district court cases considering the issue, private
individuals brought suit against a number of executive branch officials.
This case was the first time a non-FISC federal judge addressed the legality
of the metadata collection program.173
On December 16, 2013, Judge Leon granted a preliminary injunction
preventing the federal government from collecting the records of two
individuals, Larry Klayman and Charles Strange, and ordered the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
See infra Part I.E.2–3.
134 S. Ct. 638 (2013).
EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at 1.
See id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 10.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004).
See In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638, 638 (2013).
See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
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destruction of any existing records pertaining to these individuals.174 Larry
Klayman has become well known for his litigation against the government
over the past two decades and declared this the “biggest ruling in the history
of government litigation.”175 Judge Leon accepted the plaintiffs’ position
that this type of data collection is not controlled by Smith v. Maryland.176
He did, however, grant a stay of the order pending appeal due to the
“significant national security interests at stake.”177 Judge Leon also
cautioned that, should his ruling be upheld, the government should be
prepared to immediately comply with the order, as the appeal process
would likely take six months.178
3. ACLU v. Clapper
Finally, the ACLU filed suit in the Southern District of New York,
naming James Clapper, Keith Alexander, Charles Hagel, Eric Holder, and
James Comey as defendants.179 The complaint alleges that the program
exceeds it statutory authority and violates the First and Fourth
Amendments.180 The plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction discontinuing
the use of FISC orders for metadata collection, as well as an order requiring
the NSA to purge all of the data they have about the plaintiffs.181
On December 27, 2013, Judge Pauley granted the government’s motion
to dismiss, finding the metadata collection program legal.182 Like Judge
Leon, Judge Pauley dismissed the plaintiff’s statutory claims, but,
nonetheless, discussed the merits of the claims and reached the conclusion
that they would ultimately fail.183 Judge Pauley emphasized that all of the
data is relevant because the government cannot otherwise make use of the
information to find connections.184 He ultimately based his dismissal on

174. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *25 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013).
175. Michael D. Shear, Score One for Thorn in Government’s Side Behind N.S.A. Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2013, at A19.
176. See Klayman, 2013 WL 6571596, at *18–19. See infra Part II.B for a full discussion
of Smith’s application to the metadata collection program.
177. Klayman, 2013 WL 6571596, at *26.
178. Id.
179. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10. All five defendants
are high-ranking national security officers. Clapper is the director of National Intelligence,
Alexander is the director of the NSA and the chief of the Central Security Service, Hagel is
the Secretary of Defense, Holder is the U.S. Attorney General, and Comey is the director of
the FBI. Robert Mueller III was the director of the FBI at the time of the initial complaint,
but has since been replaced by Comey. See Directors, Then and Now, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/directors (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
180. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 10.
181. Id.
182. ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 2013).
183. Id. at *13.
184. See id. at *17.
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constitutional grounds, holding that the metadata collection program does
not violate either the Fourth or First Amendment.185
F. Standing and Jurisdiction
One concern with the issues surrounding the metadata collection program
is whether courts will be willing to decide the merits of the case.
Comparisons between the current issue and past cases involving NSA
surveillance programs, like Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,186 are
inapposite.
In Clapper, Amnesty International challenged the
constitutionality of section 702 of FISA,187 but the claim failed for lack of
standing since Amnesty International could not establish an injury in
fact.188 There was no evidence that Amnesty International was a target of
surveillance under the statute, and any speculation about a future injury
failed to sustain the Article III standing requirement.189
Under the present surveillance program, however, evidence of an injury
in fact exists, as there is documentation that Verizon, among other
providers, turned over phone records for the vast majority of their
customers.190 Those customers can arguably assert an invasion of privacy
and a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, in addition to statutory
claims, which is exactly what some parties have done in the current
litigation.191
Regarding In re Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Supreme
Court denied the petition for certiorari but did not state why.192 The Court
arguably could have exercised jurisdiction over the case, but ultimately
chose not to. Marbury v. Madison193 established that Congress lacks the
ability to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.194 However,
when a particular suit is filed in the Supreme Court, the Constitution’s
original jurisdiction only applies where the petitioner does not seek to
overturn a lower court decision.195 Essentially, Marbury is not a bar to an
original action that “attack[s] a lower-court decision that is not itself
directly appealable.”196 Justice Souter described such suits as “commonly
understood to be ‘original’ in the sense of being filed in the first instance in

185. Id. at *22, *24. See infra Part II.C.1.b for a full explanation of Judge Pauley’s
Fourth Amendment analysis.
186. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
187. 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006).
188. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
189. Id. at 1148–49.
190. See supra notes 2–5, 131 and accompanying text.
191. See infra Part II.
192. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
194. See id. at 178.
195. Steve Vladeck, The Supreme Court’s Power To Hear In re EPIC, LAWFARE BLOG
(July 10, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/the-supreme-courts-powerto-hear-in-re-epic/.
196. Id.
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this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of [the]
Court’s appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction.”197
Furthermore, there may have been statutory jurisdiction for the Court to
hear the petition. EPIC asserts that the Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act) and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803 and 1861(f).198
50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(b) and 1861(f)(3) give the Supreme Court the authority
to review decisions by the FISC, as appealed to the FISCR.199 The All
Writs Act allows appellate courts to exercise appellate review beyond what
is provided for by statute as long as the review is “‘in aid of’ the appellate
court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the lower court.”200 Since the Court
conceivably could have reviewed the metadata orders, the prerequisites of
the All Writs Act are satisfied.201
Another interpretation of § 1803 is that the Supreme Court can only hear
the petition if the FISCR denies a government application.202 That,
however, cannot happen here because the FISCR has not denied any
government application.203 A similar issue occurred in 2003 when the
ACLU petitioned for a writ of certiorari regarding a Department of Justice
surveillance program.204 The ACLU acknowledged that FISA only allows
for Supreme Court review following petition by the government, but
interpreted Congressional silence on the issue of approved applications to
mean that the Court could correct the FISCR’s mistakes.205 The ACLU
further asserted that the All Writs Act is designed for situations such as the
one they faced in 2003 and the current issue.206
Overall it appears that, at least in their ability to bring these suits, the
parties involved have the right to challenge the metadata collection
program.207 In the case of EPIC’s petition, the Supreme Court was always
likely to dismiss the petition since an extraordinary writ “is not a matter of

197. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring).
198. EPIC Petition, supra note 5. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) states in relevant part “the record
shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review
[a decision by the FISCR].” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006). The All Writs Act permits the
Supreme Court (and other courts established by Congress) to “issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
199. Vladeck, supra note 195.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1184.
203. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
204. See Banks, supra note 79, at 1185.
205. Id. at 1184–85.
206. See id. at 1185.
207. This, however, is contested by the defendants in ACLU v. Clapper. They argue that
the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 9–14, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994
(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug 26, 2013), 2013 WL 5221584. Similarly, in In re Electronic Privacy
Information Center, the government largely rests their argument on standing and
jurisdictional grounds, rather than emphasizing the merits of the case. See generally Brief for
the United States in Opposition, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 1358), 2013 WL 5702390.
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right,” is issued sparingly, and is entirely up to the Court’s discretion.208 It
was thought that a dismissal would probably hinge on the merits rather than
on jurisdictional grounds, as the Court is likely to allow lower courts to
address the issue first when those suits have already been filed, as is the
case here. The Court’s reasoning behind the denial, however, remains to be
determined.209
II. DEBATING THE MERITS: IS THE METADATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
LEGAL? CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND INTERPRETING
THE MEANING OF “RELEVANCE”
Central to the current litigation is the issue of what relevance means
within the context of section 215. This Part discusses the arguments in each
current suit collectively, rather than separately. Part II.A provides an
overview of where the statutory authorization for the metadata collection
program fits within the framework of the Fourth Amendment. Part II.B
focuses on defining the word “relevant” within section 215 and debates the
breadth of the term in regards to the metadata collection program. Part II.C
briefly addresses the Fourth Amendment arguments on each side and
discusses whether Smith controls.
A. Overview of the Applicable Legal Framework
If the metadata collection program is found to comply with all of the
statutory requirements, it would constitute a presumptively reasonable
search.210 That, however, would not completely insulate the program from
legal scrutiny, as it could still be found unconstitutional under either the
First or Fourth Amendment.211 It is important to understand the issue of
relevancy within the context of the Fourth Amendment framework and the
warrant requirements implemented by the courts because, although the
searches conducted by the NSA are warrantless, they still have to meet the
standards set forth in section 215 to be considered valid. The requirements
for a valid search and the requirements set forth by section 215 are strongly
intertwined, and neither can be understood without considering the other.
Should the courts find that the program complies with the statute, the
presumption of a valid search is rebuttable and the program could still be
invalidated on Fourth Amendment grounds.
This Note seeks to determine whether the metadata collection program is
legal as it is currently utilized. There are a number of debated points
pertinent to that overall conflict, but this Note will focus on two main issues
that have taken priority in the current litigation: (1) whether the data

208. SUP. CT. R. 20.1.
209. Vladeck, supra note 195.
210. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
211. See infra Part II.C. Neither of the two lower court decisions regarding this issue
have been based on statutory grounds. See ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP),
2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013); Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013
WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
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collected can be considered “relevant” (as that is the central issue in
assessing the validity of the metadata collection program under section
215), and (2) whether Smith v. Maryland governs a Fourth Amendment
analysis of the metadata collection program. The constitutional concerns,
however, are of lesser importance to this Note, as many scholars believe
that, under current precedent, the program stands on solid constitutional
footing.212
B. Is the Data “Relevant”?
The initial question in determining whether the metadata collection
program complies with 50 U.S.C. § 1861 is whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the data is relevant to the investigation.213
Understanding the meaning of the term “relevant” within section 215 has
proven challenging, and a number of arguments have been advanced in an
attempt to define the term in the manner most advantageous to each side.
The government argues that “relevant” is to be applied broadly—making
the records collection process legal.214 On the other hand, privacy
advocates feel that it must be defined narrowly, and that by collecting
billions of records, the NSA cannot reasonably be simply collecting only
Ultimately, the question turns on whether
“relevant” records.215
investigations into specific terrorist groups can create reasonable grounds to
believe that metadata of virtually the entire U.S. population is “relevant.”216
As of the writing of this Note, no non-FISC judge has decided whether
the metadata collection program is legal under section 215. In both
Klayman v. Obama and ACLU v. Clapper, the only non-FISC cases to
decide the issue to date, the judges declined to base their decisions on
statutory grounds, stating that Congress did not intend to permit judicial
review under an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim.217 Instead,
their decisions centered on the constitutional questions raised.218 Defining
relevance in the context of FISA, however, will likely be an essential part of
these cases on appeal.219
The remainder of this Part addresses the various arguments and support
on each side of the debate. Part II.B.1 looks to FISC opinions, while Part
212. See infra notes 349–50 and accompanying text.
213. Kris, supra note 136, at 18.
214. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10–11.
215. EPIC asserted that “the FISC exceeded its statutory jurisdiction when it ordered
production of millions of domestic telephone records that cannot plausibly be relevant to an
authorized investigation.” EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at *3.
216. See Kris, supra note 136, at 20.
217. Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *9–12 (D.D.C. Dec.
16, 2013). One of the main reasons why Congress did not intend for judicial review of this
nature is that third parties were never to know about the existence of § 1861 orders, much
less have the ability to litigate them. Id. at *10. Judge Pauley shared a similar sentiment.
ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2013) (“Congress did not intend that targets of section 215 orders would ever learn of
them.”).
218. See infra Part II.C.
219. See infra notes 349–50 and accompanying text.
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II.B.2 turns to the text of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 itself. Part II.B.3 compares the
statute to other sources of law that define “relevance,” and Part II.B.4
considers the legislative history of the statute.
1. Differing FISC Interpretations
The FISC continually grants orders for the metadata collection program.
The FISC first authorized the metadata collection program in 2006, and
since that authorization, the program has been renewed thirty-five times
(generally in three-month periods) by fifteen different judges.220 FISC
judges have, however, expressed mixed feelings about the program. While
all have ultimately approved it, some are much more supportive of the
program than others. Two of the FISC orders that have been made public
are representative of the conflicting views on the program. Judge Eagan
strongly supports the program, while Judge Walton had some reservations
in his approval. These opinions are discussed in turn in Parts II.B.1.a and
II.B.1.b.
a. Judge Eagan: The Metadata Collection Program Is Legal
In her August 2013 opinion regarding the issuance of an order in July
2013, Judge Eagan concluded that the standard for relevance is met by the
metadata collection program because “international terrorist operatives are
using telephone communications,” and the bulk records help “to determine
those connections between known and unknown international terrorist
operatives.”221 Judge Eagan notes that the records do not actually need to
be relevant, but that the government must show that there are “reasonable
grounds to believe” that the records sought are relevant.222 Because
Congress left the term undefined, Judge Eagan adheres to a broad reading
that “amounts to a relatively low standard.”223
Judge Eagan adopted the reasoning of a 2010 FISC opinion that noted
that a finding of relevance rests on whether the bulk collection is necessary
for the NSA to utilize tools to generate investigative leads.224 She stated
that the government had done just that by “posit[ing] that bulk telephonic
metadata is necessary to its investigations because it is impossible to know
where in the data the connections to international terrorist organizations
will be found.”225 The NSA uses the historical data once a specific terrorist
identifier is found, and maintaining the bulk data allows them to keep that
information until it is needed.226 Without the totality of the data, the

220. See Klayman, 2013 WL 6571596, at *8; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
11, at 1.
221. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *7.
226. See id.
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information gathering process is stunted, thereby rendering the records
“relevant.”
b. Judge Walton Upbraids the NSA in 2009 for Failure To Conduct the
Program in an Appropriate Manner
Judge Walton also signed the order and ultimately approved of the
metadata collection program, but remained skeptical about it. His decision
was based largely on the fact that the program had been consistently
reauthorized, but he expressed concern about the privacy of U.S. citizens
and the fact that “the FISC’s authorizations of this vast collection program
have been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [telephony]
metadata.”227 He pointed out a number of oversight problems with the
program,228 and went on to discuss his doubts about the structure and use of
the metadata collection.229 Judge Walton pointed out that “nearly all” of
the call records obtained did not concern people who were targets of an FBI
investigation, and that ordinarily, the data could not legally be obtained in
bulk (i.e., would not be deemed relevant to the investigation).230 He
concluded that this alone would usually be enough for the FISC to deny the
application for an order to a phone company.231
Despite this lack of relevance, Judge Walton granted the order based on
the government’s need for the data and the specific oversight procedures
intended to monitor the use of the records.232 Yet he strongly stated that the
FISC no longer has confidence that the government is “doing its utmost to
ensure” that the court’s instructions are fully complied with.233 As a result,
he signed the order based on the FISC’s prior determinations that the
metadata collection program complies with 50 U.S.C. § 1861, but stated
that “more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S. person information.”234
2. Textual Analysis of 50 U.S.C. § 1861
The scope of relevance has been debated in the current litigation. As
Judge Eagan and other supporters of the metadata collection program see it,
“relevant” should be read broadly. Opponents of the program, on the other
hand, feel that the term should be given its plain meaning, which they
define as “actually related” to the investigation.

227. In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913,
at *5, *8 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
228. See supra Part I.C.3.
229. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *16–20.
230. Id. at *6.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *8.
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a. The Government’s Argument: The Purpose Indicates That the Statute
Should Be Understood Broadly
The NSA reads “relevant” broadly to encompass situations such as this.
The NSA refers to general definitions to support this conclusion, such as
“anything ‘[b]earing upon, connected with, [or] pertinent to’ a specified
subject matter.”235 In enacting the statute, Congress understood that
relevance has special meaning within the law, and the government states
that a document is “relevant” not just when it directly bears on the matter,
but also where “it is reasonable to believe that it could lead to other
information that directly bears on that subject matter.”236
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, as is arguably the case
here given the debate surrounding the term, courts next look to its
purpose.237 The government contends that the data is relevant because
there is reason to believe that conducting a broad search will produce
counterterrorism information that fulfills the goal of the program in the first
place.238 As the government states, “Unless the data is aggregated, it may
not be feasible to identify chains of communications,” and the objectives
advanced by the metadata collection program would not be successful if the
NSA was limited in the amount of records it could obtain.239
b. The Opposition’s Argument: The Plain Meaning of the Statute
Invalidates the Program
Critics of the program point to the presumptively relevant definition240
from section 215.241 This includes records relating to an agent of a foreign
power and individuals in contact with a suspected agent of a foreign
power.242 It is common sense that nearly all of the records obtained from
Verizon and other phone service providers will not meet these criteria.
They therefore believe that the FBI bears the burden of showing why those
records are in fact relevant and should be included in the orders.243
Opponents further argue that “‘everything’ nullifies the relevance
limitation in the statute.”244 Essentially, they contend that if law
enforcement always has access to all records, they can inevitably identify a
subset of records as “relevant”—yet that renders the term “relevant”
essentially meaningless.245 In construing a statute, courts are supposed to

235. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 9 (quoting 13 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 561 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989)) (alterations in original).
236. Id. at 9.
237. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 271 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 8–9.
239. Id. at 13.
240. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at *21–22.
242. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006).
243. EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at *22.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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give meaning to every word that Congress used,246 but by defining bulk
collection as relevant, they would in effect be ignoring that term.
Furthermore, the government has acknowledged that the vast majority of
the data collected under the orders is not relevant to any investigation.247
Allowing the NSA to determine what is relevant once the data is in their
possession violates the plain meaning of the statute.248 In essence, critics
contend that the NSA is applying the prerequisite for collecting records
retroactively. The statute requires that there be grounds to believe the data
is relevant prior to collection, but that determination cannot be made until
the records are actually in the NSA’s possession and undergoing
analysis.249 It is not logical, according to EPIC’s supporters, to believe that
there are reasonable grounds that all, or even most, of the records collected
will be relevant, which is in direct conflict with the statute’s requirement
that there be reason to believe the collected items are relevant.250
Even if the purpose of the statute is analyzed, critics point out that the
program must comply with the guidelines set forth in Executive Order
12,333.251 One such guideline is that the “[a]gencies within the Intelligence
Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible.”252
Thus regardless of the NSA’s stated purpose, the program is not the least
intrusive means, as it affects all Americans.253
3. Comparing the Business Records Provision to Other Sources of Law
It is worth discussing other sources that define relevance, because the
term is left undefined in section 215. No one source is directly on point, but
taken collectively, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rules of civil
discovery, similar cases, and other statutes may help courts determine the
best reading of “relevant.”
a. Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Discovery
Comparisons have been drawn to the Federal Rules of Evidence’s
standard for relevance.254 Rule 401 states that evidence is relevant if “it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

246. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
247. Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Newseum Special
Program: NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and Fiction 8 (June 26, 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/195-speeches-interviews2013/887-transcript-newseum-special-program-nsa-surveillance-leaks-facts-and-fiction
(“[T]he vast majority of the data is never going to be responsive to one of the terrorismrelated queries.”).
248. Privacy Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9.
249. See id. at 16.
250. See id. at 10–11.
251. See EPIC Petition, supra note 5 at 6–7.
252. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
253. See EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at *23.
254. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6 n.20 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
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the evidence.”255 Under this analogy, information would be relevant if it
has some bearing on investigations into terrorist organizations.
The Federal Rules of Evidence require that evidence must be material
and have probative value to be considered relevant.256 Materiality
considers the fit between the evidence and the case, while probative value
refers to the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is
offered to prove.257 Importantly, one item of evidence does not need to
prove the proposition on its own; the evidence is taken en masse.258
Regarding the metadata collection program, it is not entirely clear how the
records fit this standard because the majority of the records individually fail
to meet the standard of probative value, but might meet it when considered
collectively.
The government also compares “relevant” to its use in civil discovery.259
The Supreme Court has construed it to “broadly. . . encompass any matter
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear
on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”260 Thus they argue that courts
have permitted bulk collection to satisfy a relevance standard.
b. Other Cases
Cases from other contexts may also prove helpful in defining relevance
within section 215, but again, there are conflicting interpretations and
applications.
i. Government Support
The government points to a number of cases where courts have found a
relevance standard satisfied when a large volume of information is collected
in order to identify a few pieces of pertinent information that directly
impacted the investigation.261 For example, in In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum,262 the Fourth Circuit held that all of a doctor’s files could be
relevant in an investigation of federal healthcare offenses, despite the fact
that not all of them were evidence of the offenses with which he was
charged.263 Additionally, in Carrillo Huettel, LLP v. SEC,264 the Southern
District of California held that although not all of the records requested
were relevant, they would likely contain enough relevant information for
the subpoena to be considered valid.265
255. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
256. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 306 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 308.
259. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 9; see also infra note 285 and
accompanying text.
260. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
261. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10 nn.7–9.
262. 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
263. See id. at 350.
264. Civ. No. 11cv65–WQH(CAB), 2011 WL 601369 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011).
265. Id. at *2–3.
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David Kris, former Assistant Attorney General for National Security,
points to In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Subpoena Duces Tecum266 as the
most analogous case.267 There, the government sought records about drug
dealers in Kansas City, and in order to locate them, subpoenaed
substantially all of Western Union’s records, including those of “hundreds
of innocent people.”268 The Eighth Circuit, however, approved the
subpoena but left open the possibility that on remand the subpoena could be
narrowed.269
ii. Privacy Advocates’ Support
On the other side of the debate, critics point to cases where courts have
found that bulk data collection does not amount to relevance in searches for
a few key pieces of information.270 For example, in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993,271 the Southern District of
New York held that a subpoena failed the relevancy standard because the
data sought contained too much irrelevant information along with the
pertinent data.272 The court explained that because the subpoena demanded
irrelevant documents, it was unreasonably broad.273
Additionally, in the civil discovery context, the Supreme Court has stated
that a subpoena for “all documents” was “anything but appropriate” because
it was too broad in what it sought.274 Again, none of the cases cited in the
context of the metadata collection program squarely address the issue
presented here and most are tangentially related at best. The courts will
therefore be tasked with defining relevance with little guidance from prior
decisions.
c. The Stored Communications Act Provides
a Point of Statutory Comparison
Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act establishes
procedures for the government to obtain information from electronic
communications service providers.275 While not directly related to FISA
because it is not related to preventing international terrorism, the language
of the statute is very similar to that of section 215. In order to obtain
noncontent records (i.e., records pertaining to the subscriber or customer
that do not include the content of the communication), the government must
offer “specific and articulable facts” demonstrating that there are
266. 827 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1987).
267. Kris, supra note 136, at 25.
268. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 827 F.2d at 305.
269. Id. at 305–06.
270. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 14.
271. 846 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
272. Id. at 13–14.
273. Id.
274. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 387–88 (2004). But see supra notes 259–60
and accompanying text.
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
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“reasonable grounds to believe that [the records sought] are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”276 This is slightly different
from section 215, as section 2703(d) requires specific and articulable facts,
while section 215 only requires “reasonable grounds.”277 Arguably, section
215 amounts to a lower standard, especially since the specific and
articulable facts language existed prior to September 11.278 Section
2703(d) also refers to criminal investigations, whereas section 215 is for
foreign intelligence purposes. As such, it seems, according to the
government, that Congress provided “more latitude at the production
stage,” but balanced it with “post-production checks” that are not present in
the Stored Communications Act.279
4. Legislative History from the Reauthorizations of Section 215
Over time, FISA has been amended to broaden the scope of the type of
things the government can access—as a tradeoff, however, it has become
arguably more restrictive in how those things might be accessed.280
Previously, FISA required the FBI to present “specific and articulable
facts,” rather than just a showing of relevance.281 The word “relevancy”
was added to section 215 during the 2005 and 2006 reauthorizations.282
Critics of the program point to legislative history accompanying the
amended statute in 2006, which indicates that the relevancy requirement
was added in order to limit the information available under section 215.
For example, Senator Wyden discussed his fears that the statute would be
used to fight terrorism at the expense of civil liberties, but that ultimately
the power to go on “fishing expeditions” was not included in the version to
be passed.283 Senator Feinstein noted that section 215 was changed to
“tighten[] the requirement to make it clear that investigators must not only
show relevance but also that the request pertains to a known or suspected
agent of a foreign power or their associates.”284 Putting the standard in
context, Senator Kyl indicated that “[r]elevance is a simple and well
established standard of law,” and that its use in section 215 was meant to be

276. Id. § 2703(d).
277. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
278. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
279. Id.
280. Privacy Professors’ Brief, supra note 14, at 18.
281. Complaint for Declatory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 5.
282. Compare Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2012)) (permitting a request for
an order, so long as the investigation concerns “international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities”), with USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (requiring reasonable grounds to believe that the
items sought are relevant).
283. 151 CONG. REC. 19,306 (2005) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden).
284. Id. at 19,309 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
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understood in the same manner as other areas of law like subpoenas and
civil discovery.285
The government points to the fact that the legislature has repeatedly
reenacted the statute without change.286 The problem with this is that the
majority of the information needed to make an informed decision about the
metadata collection program was, and in many cases remains, classified.
However, information was provided to members of both houses through
their respective Intelligence Committees prior to both the 2009 and 2011
reauthorizations. For example, prior to the May 2011 reenactment, the
Office of the Assistant Attorney General provided notice to the chairmen of
the Intelligence Committee of each house to share certain information with
their members.287 The report highlighted the key points of the program,
including the fact that it “collect[s] a large amount of information,” and that
the orders require the production of “substantially all of the telephone calls”
handled by a service provider.288 It also mentions that there is a system of
checks and balances in place, but that there have been compliance issues
despite those safeguards.289
According to certain members of Congress, though, they did not intend
for unbounded freedom in determining what is relevant.290 They assert that
under their understanding of the statute, the metadata collection program
goes beyond their definition of relevant and that relevant was meant to be a
limitation, not a broad standard.291 Moreover, they required that it be
relevant to an authorized investigation, rather than general efforts to combat
terrorism.292 Congressman Sensenbrenner, writing for at least some of his
colleagues, argues that they understood “relevant” to be a limiting factor,
and that they did not intend for it to allow the kind of dragnet collection that
the NSA is currently conducting.293

285. See 152 CONG. REC. 2426 (2006) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); see also supra notes
259–60, 274 and accompanying text.
286. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 17.
287. Letter from Ronald Welch, Assistant Attorney General, to the Chairmen of the
Congressional Intelligence Committees (Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/2011_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf.
288. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S BULK
COLLECTION PROGRAMS FOR USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION 1, 3 (2011), available
at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2011_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf.
289. Id. at 3–4. For a discussion of some of the compliance issues, see supra Part I.C.3.
290. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. in Support of
Plaintiffs, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2013.09.04_amicus_brief_-_rep_
sensenbrenner.pdf [hereinafter Sensenbrenner Brief].
291. Id. at 2.
292. Id. at 3.
293. See id. at 4. For more on Congressman Sensenbrenner’s opinions, see infra notes
297–99 and accompanying text.
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5. Executive and Legislative Responses:
Embrace the Program or Rein It In?
The metadata collection program has proven to be extremely divisive,
and the recent attention given to NSA surveillance has caused politicians to
weigh in on the debate. The remainder of this section provides an overview
of public officials’ statements concerning the program, competing bills in
Congress addressing mass data collection, and the recommendations of a
presidential task force assembled to deal with the issue.
a. Conflicting Public Statements
The Obama Administration generally still supports the program, as
evidenced by statements made by Robert Litt, General Counsel at the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, over the summer of 2013.294 In his
address, he characterized Snowden’s leaks as “reckless” and emphasized
the legality of the program.295 He outlined the rationale behind the
conclusion that the program is legal, taking care to note that it is not just
“the Intelligence Community alone” that believes bulk collection is
authorized under section 215, but also FISC judges and Congress.296
On the other side of the debate, Congressman Sensenbrenner, author of
the Patriot Act and a member of Congress during all of the Patriot Act’s
reauthorizations, offered an intriguing opinion. He noted that the metadata
collection program is not being used in the manner that section 215 was
intended.297 In his view, mass data collection exceeds the scope of the
statute’s design.298 By necessity, bulk collection brings in millions of
unrelated records, but that goes “beyond any reasonable understanding of
[relevant].”299
As discussed, Sensenbrenner indicated that he was unaware of how the
metadata collection program operated at the time that he reauthorized it, but
members of Congress were provided with information outlining the basics
of the program.300 Senate Majority Leader Reid indicated that it is illogical
for Senators (and presumably Congressmen) to say that they were unaware
of what was occurring.301 As he points out, there were “many” classified

294. Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Privacy,
Technology and National Security: An Overview of Intelligence Collection (July 19, 2013),
available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/195-speeches
-interviews-2013/896-privacy,-technology-and-national-security-an-overview-of-intelligence
-collection.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See generally Sensenbrenner Brief, supra note 290 (arguing that Congress did not
authorize the type of data collection the NSA is currently undertaking).
298. See generally id.
299. See id. at 5–6.
300. See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.
301. Michael McAuliff & Sabrina Siddiqui, Harry Reid: If Lawmakers Didn’t Know
About NSA Surveillance, It’s Their Own Fault, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2013, 4:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/harry-reid-nsa_n_3423393.html.
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and unclassified meetings, and if an individual did not avail himself of the
opportunity to attend, he should not be able to complain that he was ill
informed after the fact.302
b. Congressional Response: Competing Bills To Define the Scope of
Governmental Authority Under § 1861
Over the summer of 2013, a one-sentence bill was introduced and
narrowly failed to pass the House of Representatives.303 The bill would
have required all 50 U.S.C. § 1861 orders funded by FISA provisions to
include the sentence, “This Order limits the collection of any tangible
things . . . to those tangible things that pertain to a person who is the subject
of an investigation described in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1861).”304 This blanket prohibition
ultimately failed, but indicates the growing concern over the metadata
collection program.
More recently, there was a renewed attempt to revise FISA. Some
members of Congress have indicated a willingness to curb the power of the
NSA regarding domestic surveillance through the introduction of the USA
FREEDOM Act (Freedom Act).305 The bill is being co-authored by
Congressman Sensenbrenner, and would end “dragnet collection of phone
records under Section 215” by requiring that the records obtained are
“relevant and material to an investigation,” a more exacting standard than
the one currently enforced by FISA.306 Additionally, the bill seeks to add a
more exacting judicial review process and enhanced accountability and
transparency.307 The main goal of the bill is to tighten the rules
surrounding the collection of metadata by requiring that the items collected
pertain to “a foreign power or agent of one; the activities of a target who is
a suspected agent of a foreign power; a person in contact with a known or
suspected agent of a foreign power,” which, in effect, eliminates the
viability of the metadata collection program.308
While some of Congress is looking to rein in the power of FISA, others
are criticizing those efforts. Patrick Kelley, acting general counsel of the
FBI, stated that the logic behind the Freedom Act is flawed because it
presumes that the NSA knows exactly who they are after, which is not
true.309 He posits that bulk collection is necessary. In that same vein,

302. Id.
303. Kris, supra note 136, at 56–57.
304. 159 CONG. REC. H5023 (daily ed. July 24, 2013).
305. Id. at S7618 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2013).
306. Id. at S7619.
307. See id.
308. Raffaela Wakeman, An Overview of FISA Reform Options on Capitol Hill, LAWFARE
BLOG (Nov. 3, 2013 10:08 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/an-overview-of-fisareform-options-on-capitol-hill/.
309. See Jared A. Favole, Intelligence Lawyers Cool to Bill To Revamp NSA, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 4, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230439120
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Senator Feinstein, chairperson of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, along with Ranking Member Chambliss have introduced their
own bill in opposition to the view that the Freedom Act authors take.310
The FISA Improvements Act would affirm the legality of the metadata
collection program, but would codify restrictions on when and how the data
can be accessed and used.311 It would impose a strict retention period of
five years for any data collected under section 215, and would require
approval by the attorney general for querying any data older than three
years.312 The bill would also codify certain issues that were previously
addressed in FISC orders, including the limit on hops and the number of
people who can access the collected metadata.313 Finally, the bill would
require the NSA to submit its findings of RAS for U.S. persons to the FISC
for judicial review, and denial of the request would result in destruction of
that collection.314 The bill largely keeps the metadata collection program
intact, while providing for some additional oversight and explicitly
codifying the practices that are already ongoing.
c. The Executive Branch Response
While members of Congress immediately began a dialogue about the
program, the executive branch was slower to take action. President Obama
assembled a task force in August 2013 to brainstorm potential changes to
mass data collection, and then in January 2014, gave a public address
outlining his decision based on the recommendations of that task force.
i. The Presidential Task Force Recommends Changes
In August 2013, President Obama established a task force, the Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, to assess the NSA
metadata collection program and propose changes.315 The group ultimately
proposed more than forty changes to the NSA’s current surveillance
tactics.316 In their final report, the panel recommended that the data be
maintained by the service providers, rather than collected by the NSA, and
that the government only have access to a specific individual’s data
pursuant to a court order.317 The report also recommended changes to the
FISC appointment process, suggesting that the power be distributed among
all nine Supreme Court justices, rather than remaining solely in the hands of
the chief justice.318 The report ultimately does not call for a complete
shutdown of the program, but did state that the current system “creates
310. Wakeman, supra note 308.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Siobhan Gorman, Panel Pushes Revamp of NSA, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2013, at A1.
316. See David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, Obama Is Urged To Sharply Curb N.S.A.
Data Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013, at A1.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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potential risks to public trust, personal privacy, and civil liberty.”319 The
group’s recommendations are not binding, but President Obama has
indicated that he is open to the suggestions provided.320
ii. President Obama Begins the Process of Change
In a January 2014 speech, President Obama outlined a number of
changes to be implemented to the metadata collection program, among
other NSA surveillance programs.321 The address called for FISC approval
before data can be examined by analysts, except in cases of emergency.322
Additionally, the President limited any analysis to two hops, rather than the
current three.323 As far as where and how the records will be stored and
whether the FISC will be restructured, the President left those decisions in
the hands of Congress.324
C. Fourth Amendment: Are These Unreasonable Searches?
While the Fourth Amendment concerns raised by the metadata collection
program are important, this Note only discusses them briefly. If the courts
decide that the metadata collection program comports with FISA, they will
then be tasked with deciding the question of whether the orders are
constitutional. The essential inquiry in that analysis is whether Smith v.
Maryland and the third-party doctrine control the type of data collection
that the NSA is currently conducting. It is important to note, however, that
even if the activity amounts to a search under the Fourth Amendment, it
may still be “reasonable” based on the strong governmental interests at
stake.325 Part II.C.1 examines the government’s argument and Judge
Pauley’s decision that Smith controls. Part II.C.2 discusses the various
arguments advanced by privacy groups, and the opinion from Klayman v.
Obama in which Judge Leon found that Smith does not control this
particular issue.
1. Smith v. Maryland Directly Controls This Issue
The NSA contends that Smith controls a Fourth Amendment analysis of
the metadata collection program. Judge Pauley supported this conclusion in
ACLU v. Clapper.
319. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 17 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
320. See Sanger & Savage, supra note 316.
321. See Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on Phone
Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1.
322. See id.
323. See id. (“[The NSA] will be able to scrutinize phone calls that are only two steps
removed from a number associated with a terrorism suspect, rather than three.”).
324. See Peter Baker & Jeremy W. Peters, With Plan To Overhaul Spying, the
Divisiveness Is in the Details, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, at A19.
325. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851(RJL), 2013 WL 6571596, at *22 (D.D.C. Dec.
16, 2013); see also infra note 353 and accompanying text.
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a. The Government’s Argument
The NSA argues that because the data collected by the program has all
been voluntarily turned over to a third party, the subscribers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in it and there is no Fourth Amendment
violation.326 The government takes this position even while acknowledging
that the information collected here is more extensive than the simple pen
register at issue in Smith.327
The government bolsters its argument by pointing out that the Court
affirmed its holding in Smith in subsequent cases, and lower courts have
found that the holding in Smith goes beyond the narrow limitations of a
classic pen register.328 Under Supreme Court precedent, the reasoning in
Smith applies “even if there is an understanding that the third party will
treat the information as confidential.”329 For example, in SEC v. Jerry T.
O’Brien, Inc.,330 the Court stated that “when a person communicates
information to a third party even on the understanding that the
communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys
that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.”331
Additionally, in United States v. Reed,332 the Ninth Circuit found that
collecting call origination, length, and time information was nothing more
than a pen register and trap-and-trace device, leaving the target with no
reasonable expectation of privacy.333 The government argues that United
States v. Jones is easily distinguished from the issue here because it does
not involve a physical trespass similar to the GPS in Jones and thus does
not affect the current third-party doctrine.334
b. The Judicial Support: ACLU v. Clapper
In assessing the legality of the metadata collection program, Judge
Pauley accepted the government’s position that Smith controls. First, he
accepted the premise that information voluntarily conveyed to a third party
is no longer afforded the same level of privacy.335 Moreover, he stated that
“[t]he ACLU’s reliance on the concurring opinions in Jones is misplaced”
because the Court did not overrule Smith, and it is improper for lower
courts to speculate on whether precedent will be overruled.336 Therefore, at

326. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 19.
327. Id. at 20.
328. See id. at 21.
329. Id. at 20.
330. 467 U.S. 735 (1984).
331. Id. at 743.
332. 575 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2009).
333. See id. at 914.
334. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 20.
335. See ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *21
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
336. Id. at *22.
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least for now, lower courts are bound by Smith and do not have the freedom
to ignore the third-party doctrine.337
2. Smith v. Maryland Is Distinguishable
Part II.C.2.a provides an overview of the privacy advocates’ argument
that Smith is distinguishable from the metadata collection program and
therefore does not control a Fourth Amendment analysis. Judge Leon
supported this outcome in his opinion in Klayman v. Obama, which is
outlined in Part II.C.2.b.
a. The Privacy Advocates’ Argument
Privacy advocates assert that the metadata collection program violates the
Fourth Amendment on several grounds. First, privacy advocates argue that
because the orders compel phone companies to turn over all records on a
daily basis, they are general warrants, which are banned by the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement.338
Privacy advocates further argue that Smith v. Maryland is distinguishable
from the current facts and was wrongly decided.339 Smith involved a single
suspect, whereas the metadata collection program involves mass
surveillance that can reveal more about an individual’s habits and personal
life than a simple pen register that only records what numbers are being
called.340 Moreover, the data collected here involves routing information,
which includes data about the cell sites involved and the path of the call.341
This type of data goes beyond what was collected in Smith, because it
allows the NSA to track an individual’s location to some degree.342
Privacy advocates suggest that even if Smith controls, the Court should
reconsider the third-party doctrine in order to adapt to modern
technology.343 Advocates maintain the public is aware that records are
turned over to their service providers, but there is no reason to assume those
records are available beyond that closed universe.344 In Jones, members of
the Court suggested that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” because we live in a “digital age”
where people are constantly revealing information about themselves to third
parties.345 Echoing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith, it has become
impossible for people to conduct their ordinary business without exposing

337. See id.
338. Cato Brief, supra note 15, at 10–11.
339. Id. at 14.
340. Id. at 18–19.
341. EPIC Petition, supra note 5, at 26–27.
342. See id. at 28.
343. Cato Brief, supra note 15, at 19.
344. Id. at 20.
345. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see
also supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
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themselves to the risk of surveillance.346 These groups assert that the time
for reconsideration has come and the metadata collection program provides
the ideal platform to do so.347
b. The Judicial Support: Klayman v. Obama
In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon was the first non-FISC judge to
evaluate the metadata collection program and was presented with arguments
concerning both section 215 and the Fourth Amendment.348 Judge Leon
chose to grant the injunction on Fourth Amendment grounds. This became
a controversial point, as some scholars feel that the metadata collection
program rests on solid constitutional grounds given the Smith third-party
doctrine, and that the real gray area is whether the program exceeds its
There is speculation that on appeal, “the
statutory authority.349
constitutional issue will disappear from the case altogether.”350 Judge
Leon, however, stated that the issue before the Court in Smith was “a far cry
from the issue in this case,” and that because Smith is such an old decision
with respect to technological advances, it cannot be considered precedent
for this issue.351 Judge Leon emphasized that while the data itself might not
be drastically different from that at issue in Smith, the relationship people
now have with their phones, as opposed to thirty-four years ago when Smith
was decided, significantly alters the legal landscape.352 Judge Leon
concluded that the plaintiffs had shown a significant likelihood that they
would succeed on the merits of their claim, a requirement to obtain a
preliminary injunction because the metadata collection program does not
meet the standard for “special needs,” another exception to the warrant
While his constitutional analysis raises interesting
requirement.353
questions, the real issue on appeal will likely center on the statutory
authority for the program.

346. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
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III. DEFINING RELEVANCE: PROPOSING A RETURN TO A MORE
RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF SEARCHES AND KEEPING
PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE
Taking all of the arguments into account and considering the national
security concerns, the ideal solution is a middle ground between the two
sides where the NSA is not completely prevented from collecting data, but
also has more limits on its authority and greater oversight to ensure the
proper use of the records it does obtain. Part III.A argues that under current
precedent, the metadata program is permissible, but in spite of this, the
Court or Congress should step in to limit the NSA’s power to collect bulk
data. Part III.B outlines a potential framework for establishing a
compromise between the two sides.
A. The Metadata Collection Program Is Legal
but Should Be Limited in Scope
Ultimately, it appears that the metadata collection program is authorized
based on current interpretations of the law. Smith v. Maryland provides the
Fourth Amendment basis for obtaining the records, and although the Court
has indicated that advances in technology might necessitate reevaluation,
they have yet to do so.354 The rationale for the metadata collection program
currently rests largely on the fact that it has been approved by fifteen
different FISC judges,355 and outside of a common sense definition of
“relevant,” there is no overwhelming evidence that the statute has been
wrongly interpreted. There is nothing to prevent the Court, however, from
shifting back to a more restrictive view of searches. Technology is
developing faster than ever before and, as a whole, Americans are more
reliant on it than in previous decades. As such, the law needs to account for
the inability of people to deny information to their third-party service
providers and reevaluate the breadth of what is currently authorized by
FISA.356
This goal can be achieved through either reform or elimination. Reform
would entail providing for more stringent oversight or stricter criteria for
what types of records can be collected and under what circumstances it can
be compiled. Elimination, on the other hand, would involve a general

354. See supra Parts I.A.1.b.ii, II.C.1.
355. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
356. This approach has been advocated previously in a more general Fourth Amendment
context. See, e.g., Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977, 1033 (2008) (“[W]e would do well to reconsider the modern
contours of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether, owing to the pervasive
capability of modern technology to easily intrude into the most intimate details of our life,
the People have any expectation of privacy or right to be secure.”); Russell L. Weaver, The
Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing Technology, 80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1225 (2011)
(discussing the potential shortcomings of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and
the possibility that it does not adequately address concerns in a more technologically
advanced world).

2440

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

prohibition on mass data collection entirely.357 The current response seems
to favor reform, and while it might be achieved by any of the three
branches, it appears that any significant change is going to be the result of a
collective effort. The current litigation gives the courts the appropriate
platform for reining in bulk data collection, and the executive and
legislative branches have taken initial steps in working towards long-term
solutions.358
B. The Program Should Continue on a Smaller and More Defined Scale
The metadata collection program demonstrates the conflict between the
need for secrecy and the value of transparency.359 Clearly, for public
safety, the government must be able to keep certain information classified,
but at the same time, in order to maintain a free society, the public should
be privy to certain information about government surveillance. Because the
goals of ensuring national security and protecting the American public are
worthy and important, the ideal choice—though intensive and likely a very
lengthy process—would be an overhaul of the existing FISA structure.
1. Evaluating the Steps Already Taken
Short of changing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (although some
members of the Court have hinted that it may be time to do so), reform of
FISA, rather than elimination, is the ideal solution. President Obama has
taken the initial steps towards change,360 but his solutions fall short of a
long-term fix. For some of the more difficult and intricate decisions, the
President has called on Congress to help. This, however, is problematic
given the current divide on the issue as evidenced by the competing bills.361
The Freedom Act goes too far in the opposite direction from the current
state of electronic surveillance because it would essentially shut down the
metadata collection program.362 The data is meant to be useful in finding
connections and working towards the goal of preventing terrorism, and
without that information, national security is in jeopardy.363 Patrick Kelley,
acting general counsel of the FBI, indicated that the approach advocated in
the Freedom Act is flawed because it presumes that there are specific
targets, but it is not always entirely clear who intelligence officers are
looking for until they have started analyzing the data.364 The FISA

357. This approach is being contemplated in Congress through the Freedom Act. See
supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text.
359. Kris, supra note 136, at 41; see also ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP),
2013 WL 6819708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (“The natural tension between protecting
the nation and preserving civil liberty is squarely presented by the government’s bulk
telephony metadata collection program.”).
360. See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
364. See Favole, supra note 309.
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Improvements Act, on the other hand, does not go far enough, as it
primarily serves to codify the existing structure, which President Obama
has decided against.365
2. Where Do We Go From Here? Scaling Back the Program
The success of the metadata collection program is controversial and it is
not entirely clear how effective it has been in preventing terrorism. Some
reports state that the NSA cannot point to any significant number of plots
prevented by the program or any other objective measure of success.366
Others, however, suggest that the program has been considerably beneficial.
For example, Judge Pauley pointed to three separate times in 2009 where
metadata was queried in connection with terrorist plots that were ultimately
foiled.367 These three instances, even standing alone, merit the continuance
of the metadata collection program in some form. Preventing just one act
of terrorism indicates success, but the bigger question is how much
individual privacy the American public should have to sacrifice to achieve
that success. At this time, there is not enough reported value in the program
to warrant its continuance on its current scale.
Even accepting that the program may have prevented a number of
terrorist plots, the NSA has not explained why less obtrusive measures
would be inadequate to achieve the goal of preventing terrorist activities.
Because the data can only be queried if it is one of the identified, RASapproved numbers,368 there is no reason why the NSA could not request
those records specifically in the order. Arguably, this is a more
cumbersome process, as any numbers that are in contact with the identifier
would then also need to be requested and so on until the third hop (or
second after President Obama’s changes are implemented)369 was
completed.
Since it would be burdensome and inefficient to collect the records this
way, the best alternative seems to be limiting the scope of what FISC orders
may request, which would, in essence, eliminate bulk data collection with
few exceptions. With the level of technology available, it would certainly
be feasible to obtain a group of records for numbers in contact with
identified terrorist numbers. Essentially, this approach could allow the
NSA to obtain the data for the three hops that its analysts are currently
permitted to query without obtaining data beyond that. This would not act
as a blanket prohibition on metadata collection and would even permit large
amounts of records to be obtained simultaneously, but would afford the
general population a greater level of privacy protection than the current
365. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text.
366. Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans’ Metadata.
So End Collection, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:02 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence.
367. See ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP), 2013 WL 6819708, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
368. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text.
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system permits. Service providers would be responsible for keeping the
data, as they already are, and would only provide the necessary information
to government officials.370 Also, this approach would not require the court
order that President Obama has implemented. While court approval sounds
good in theory, the FISC has proven that it is inclined to rubber-stamp
anything the NSA requests. The proceedings would also still be secretive
and one-sided, therefore resulting in no added protection to the current
system, while slowing the process down.
The costs of the current FISA structure have proven to far outweigh its
benefits. Although the right to be free from searches and seizures is not
absolute, the metadata collection program in its current form constitutes an
unreasonable level of intrusion. The NSA points out that there are stringent
oversight procedures371 in place, but even with those, there have been
significant compliance breaches372 that seem unlikely to be fixed if the
statute remains in its current form. By creating more transparency—even if
that means just providing more detailed information to Congress—and
limiting the number and types of records that can be obtained with one
order, the objectives of the metadata program could be fulfilled while
sacrificing less privacy.
CONCLUSION
Public opinion is changing and, as such, the law needs to be modified to
account for those perceptions. Because technology is constantly evolving
and plays such a significant role in our daily lives, the law needs to adapt to
this shift and take a more expansive view of the expectation of privacy. It
seems fairly clear that current Fourth Amendment precedent permits this
type of surveillance, but the Court has indicated a willingness to potentially
reconsider this structure.
Combined with the ambiguity of the terminology in 50 U.S.C. § 1861
and the far-reaching effects of the metadata collection program, it seems
now is the perfect time to do just that. The term “relevant” cannot
reasonably be understood to encompass the phone records of all Americans,
but the national security interests that the program seeks to protect are still
extremely important. Rather than discontinuing the program entirely,
limitations need to be imposed that clearly delineate when and how records
can be collected and data may be used.

370. This particular suggestion was also one of the forty-six recommendations advocated
for by the presidential task force. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 145–49, 228 and accompanying text.

